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Abstract
We implement the levels structure value (Winter, 1989) for coopera-
tive transfer utility games with a levels structure. The mechanism is a
generalization of the bidding mechanism by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001).
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ac o o p e r a t i v eg a m ed e s c r i b e sac o n ﬂictive situation among a ﬁnite number
of agents or players. Even though players are assumed to have independent
interests, they can beneﬁt from cooperation. When this cooperation is carried
out, the question is how the beneﬁt shall be distributed among the players.
This problem has been studied from diﬀerent approaches. The aim is to
deﬁne a solution concept which gives a “fair” (or at least “reasonable”) allocation
for each problem. This allotment must take into account the contribution of each
player to the game.
Within cooperative games, transfer utility (TU) games have been deeply
studied. In TU games, utility is freely transferable among members of a coali-
tion. A widely studied solution concept for TU games is the Shapley value
(presented by Shapley in 1953).
Once a solution concept has been established, the implementation for this
solution aims to state a mechanism (or non-cooperative game) such that players,
by behaving strategically, get as ﬁnal outcome the one proposed by the solution
concept.
In this context, we say that a mechanism implements the Shapley value
(or any other) if two properties are satisﬁed. First, there must be some kind of
equilibrium such that their ﬁnal payoﬀ is the Shapley value. Second, every equi-
librium must have as ﬁnal payoﬀ the Shapley value. The ﬁrst property is needed
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1since, even if it is proved that the Shapley value arises in each equilibrium, it
may occur that the non-cooperative game has no equilibria.
Implementation for the Shapley value in TU games has been studied by sev-
eral authors. For example, Gul (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Winter (1994),
Dasgupta and Chiu (1998), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) or Evans (1996). Re-
cently, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), present a mechanism (the bidding
mechanism) which has remarkable features.
In the bidding mechanism, one of the players (the proposer) should propose
an allocation. If all the other players agree, this is the ﬁnal payoﬀ.I fa tl e a s t
one of the other players does not accept the proposed allocation, the proposer
leaves the game and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of the players.
A key feature in the bidding mechanism is the way the proposer is chosen.
Since the ﬁnal payoﬀ depends on the identity of the proposer, in a ﬁrst stage
the players should bid for the right to be the proposer. The player who presents
the highest net bid is chosen as proposer.
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein show that in equilibrium, all players have the
same probability to be chosen as proposer. Furthermore, if the game is zero-
monotonic, the equilibrium payoﬀ is the Shapley value.
In equilibrium, the bidding mechanism may ﬁnish in one round (when no
player drops out) or in more than one. However, the latter only happens when
the game is not strictly zero-monotonic.
F r e q u e n t l y ,w eh a v em o r ea v a i l a b l ei n f o r m a t i o nt h a nt h o s eg i v e nb yt h e
characteristic function of the game. For example, let us consider the members of
the European Union Parliament. Even though all of them have the same rights,
they do not act independently, since they belong to diﬀerent political parties.
Furthermore, political parties are not completely independent from each other.
On a higher level, parties of similar ideology may be formally associated, such
like the Social-democratic or the Socialist Parties are, and so on.
We call this cooperation description of the players a levels structure. Solution
concepts which take into account levels structures are the Owen value (presented
by Owen in 1977) for a single level, and the levels structure value (suggested
by Owen in 1977 and studied by Winter in 1989). The levels structure value is
a generalization of the Owen value for more than one level. Furthermore, the
Owen value is a generalization of the Shapley value.
In Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2001), the bidding mechanism by Pérez-
Castrillo and Wettstein is generalized so that a single-level structure is taken
into account. The resulting non-cooperative game implements the Owen value.
In this article, we move a step ahead. We modify the bidding mechanism so
that a general levels structure is considered. To do so, we generalize the bidding
mechanism to a new mechanism, called the levels bidding mechanism.
Given a levels structure with h levels, the levels bidding mechanism has
h rounds. In Round 1, the members of the same coalition at this level play
the bidding mechanism, trying to obtain the resources of the whole coalition.
Eventually, we can ﬁnd a player (called the representative) out of each coalition,
who obtains the resources of his own coalition, or of a subcoalition of it if one or
more players are removed. In the second round, the representatives who are in
2the same coalition at the second level repeat the process taking into account the
resources obtained in the previous round. The process goes on until reaching
the level h.
In Section 2 we present the notation and deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we deﬁne
formally the coalitional bidding mechanism and prove that it implements the
levels structure value.
2 The model
We consider a cooperative game in characteristic form (N,v),w h e r eN =
{1,...,n} is the set of players and v :2 N → R is a characteristic function
satisfying v(∅)=0 . We denote by TU(N) the set of cooperative games.
A coalition of (N,v) is a nonempty subset S ⊂ N.W e s a y t h a t S ⊂ N
supports v if v(T)=v(S) for any T ⊃ S.
We say that (N,v) is zero-monotonic if v(S ∪{i}) ≥ v(S)+v({i}) for every
S ⊂ N\{i}.
We say that v is superadditive if v(S ∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for every S,T ∈ N
such that S ∩ T = ∅.
Notice that superadditivity implies zero-monotonicity.
A coalition structure on N is a partition C = {C1,...,Cm} of N, i.e. Cq∩Cr =




Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C,w ed e n o t eb yC−i the coalition structure on N\{i} which
equals C after removing player i, i.e. C−i = {C1,...,Cq−1,C q\{i},C q+1...,Cm}.
Notice that this means that C−i may have one less coalition than C.
Given v characteristic function on N,a n dS ⊂ N,w ed e ﬁne (S,vS) ∈ TU(S)
as the game v restricted to the player set S, i.e. vS(T)=v(T) for all T ⊂ S.
In particular, we denote v−i = vN\{i} and v−S = vN\S.
A levels structure on N is a sequence C =( C0,C1,...,Ch), h ≥ 1 with Cl
(0 ≤ l ≤ h) coalition structure on N such that:
1. C0 = {{1},{2},...,{n}}.
2. Ch = {N}.
3. If Cq ∈ Cl with 0 <l≤ h then Cq =
S
S∈Q
S for some Q ⊂ Cl−1.
We call Cl the l-th level of C.W es a yt h a tC is a levels structure of degree
h. Thus, the levels structure C has h +1levels.
If h =1 ,w es a yt h a tC is a trivial levels structure.
Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C1 with n>1,w ed e n o t eb yC−i the levels structure on




Given S ∈ Cl,w ed e n o t eb yC−S the levels structure on N\S induced by C.
Assume h ≥ 2.W e d e ﬁne by C/C1 the levels structure induced by C by
dropping out the level C0 and considering the coalitions Cq ∈ C1 as players.
3Whenever Cq ∈ C1 is considered as a player in C/C1,i ti sd e n o t e db y[Cq].W e
also denote by [Cl] (1 ≤ l ≤ h) the coalition structure which comes out from Cl
by considering the coalitions of C1 as players.














This new levels structure satisﬁes conditions 1, 2 and 3. Furthermore, C/C1
has degree h − 1.
Let LTU(N) be the set of all (N,v,C) with (N,v) ∈ TU(N) cooperative




is the game LTU
¡
C1¢
deﬁn e do nt h e











for all Q ⊂ C1.
A solution concept on LTU(N) is a function f : LTU(N) → RN which
assigns to each game (N,v,C) ∈ LTU(N) a vector on RN,s ot h a tfi(N,v,C)
represents the payoﬀ received by player i ∈ N.
In this article, we use two solution concepts for LTU.T h e Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) and the levels structure value, suggested by Owen (1977) and
characterized by Winter (1989).





|T|!(n − |T| − 1)!
n!
[v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)].
The levels structure value is a generalization of the Shapley value to games
with levels structure, i.e., when the levels structure is trivial, both solution con-
cepts give the same payoﬀ vector. In order to deﬁne it, we need some additional
notation.
We denote by Π the set of all permutations on N. Given a levels structure
C,w ed e ﬁne by induction Π1(C) ⊂ Π2(C) ⊂ ... ⊂ Πh(C) as follows
Πh(C)=Π.
Given the sets Πl+1(C) ⊂ Πl+2(C) ⊂ ... ⊂ Πh(C),w ed e ﬁne:
Πl(C)=
©
π ∈ Πl+1(C):∀j,k ∈ Cq ∈ Cl,∀i ∈ N,π(j) < π(i) < π(k) ⇒ i ∈ Cq
ª
.
4In particular, permutations in Π1(C) are those in which the players in the
same coalition on any level appear always together.
Given π ∈ Π, i ∈ N,w ed e n o t eb yPπ
i = {j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)} the set of
predecessors of i under π.W ec a l llevels structure value (Winter, 1989) to the







i ∪ {i}) − v(Pπ
i )]
for all i ∈ N.
This solution concept generalizes the Owen value (1977) for h =2with
coalition structure C1 and the Shapley value for h =1 .
A simple and powerful characterization for the levels structure value is as
follows (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996). The levels structure value is the only
solution concept on LTU(N) which satisﬁes eﬃciency and balanced contribu-
tions.




Balanced contributions. For any (N,v,C) ∈ LTU (N) and any S,T ∈ Cl
with 0 ≤ l<hsuch that S,T ⊂ R ∈ Cl+1, S 6= T,w eh a v e
ΨS(N,v,C) − ΨS(N\T,v−T,C−T)=ΨT(N,v,C) − ΨT(N\S,v−S,C−S).
Furthermore, the levels structure value also satisﬁes additivity and quotient
game property (Winter, 1989).
Additivity. For any (N,v,C), (N,w,C) ∈ LTU (N),w eh a v e
Ψ(N,v+ w,C)=Ψ(N,v,C)+Ψ(N,w,C)
with (N,v+w) t h eT Ug a m ed e ﬁned on N by (v +w)(S)=v(S)+w(S)
for all S ⊂ N.







53 The levels bidding mechanism
Given a cooperative game (N,v), Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) design a
non-cooperative game, called the bidding mechanism. In the bidding mechanism,
players bid for the right to propose a payoﬀ, which should be accepted by all
the other players. Otherwise the prososer leaves the game. Pérez-Castrillo
and Wettstein prove that the payoﬀ of any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE from now) of this mechanism always coincides with the Shapley value
of the cooperative game (N,v). Thus, this mechanism implements the Shapley
value in SPNE.
Our mechanism is played in several rounds. In each round, coalitions in each
coalition structure play a bidding mechanism in order to obtain the resources
of their own coalition. Namely, they bid for the right to propose a payoﬀ.I f
this oﬀer is not accepted by the other members of the coalition, the proposer
leaves the game. If the oﬀer is accepted by all the members of the coalition, and
this happens in every coalition, the proposers become representatives of their
coalitions and they move to the next round.
We now present the levels bidding mechanism (LBM) formally. We proceed
by double induction on h (degree of C)a n dn (number of players).
For h =1 , the players play a single round. This round comprises the bid-
ding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) associated with the game
(N,v).
Assume that we know the rules of the LBM when the levels structure has
degree h − 1,a n di tc o m p r i s e sh − 1 rounds.
If there is only one player i, he obtains v({i}). Assume now that we know
the rules of the LBM when played by n − 1 players. Then, for a set of players
N = {1,...,n} and a levels structure C =( C0,C1,...,Ch) with C1 = {C1,...,Cm},
t h eL B Mp r o c e e d sa sf o l l o w s ,
Round 1. The players of any coalition Cq ∈ C1 play the bidding mechanism trying
to obtain the resources of Cq. Formally, if there is only one player i,t h e n
this player has his resources. Assume now that we know the rules when
played by |Cq| − 1 players. For |Cq| > 1 it proceeds as follows
Stage 1. Each player i ∈ Cq makes bids bi
j ∈R for every j ∈ Cq \{ i}.F o r










αq = argmaxi{Bi}. In the case of a non-unique maximizer, αq is
randomly chosen among the maximizing indices.
Stage 2. Player αq, called the proposer, makes an oﬀer y
αq
i to every player
i ∈ Cq \{ αq}.
Stage 3. The players of Cq\{αq}, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer.
If a rejection is encountered, we say the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise,
we say the oﬀer is accepted.
6The coalitions of C1 play sequentially in the order C1,...,Cm until either
we ﬁnd Cq0 ∈ C1 and αq0 ∈ Cq0 such that the oﬀer of αq0 is rejected, or
for any Cq ∈ C1 the oﬀer of αq is accepted.
In the ﬁrst case, player αq0 pays b
αq
i to every player i ∈ Cq \{ αq} and





i .A l l
players other than αq0 proceed to play the LBM with (N0,v0,C0) where
N0 = N \{ αq0}, v0 = v−αq0,a n dC0 = C−αq0.A n y p l a y e r i ∈ Cq0 \
{αq0} obtains as ﬁnal payoﬀ the sum of the bids received, b
αq0
i ,a n dt h e
payoﬀ outcome of the mechanism corresponding to (N0,C0,v0).A n yp l a y e r
i ∈ N \ Cq0 obtains as ﬁnal payoﬀ the payoﬀ outcome of the mechanism
corresponding to (N0,C0,v0).




i to every i ∈
Cq\{αq} and becomes the representative of coalition Cq.T h i sm e a n st h a t
player αq goes to Round 2 with all the resources of Cq. Moreover, the pay-












Any other player i ∈ Cq \{αq} leaves the non-cooperative game obtaining





After ﬁnishing Round 1, for any Cq ∈ C1 we can ﬁnd the representative
(denoted by rq) of this coalition.
Rounds 2 throught h. The representatives play the LBM associated with the quotient game
(C1,v/C1,C/C1),w h e r ee a c hrq plays the role of [Cq]. These rounds are
well deﬁned by induction on h. For any representative rq,w ed e n o t eb y
p2
rq the payoﬀ obtained by rq (or [Cq]) in these rounds.
The ﬁnal payoﬀ obtained by any representative rq is the sum of the payoﬀs
obtained in all the rounds, i.e. p1
rq + p2
rq.
We must note that the LBM terminates in a ﬁnite number of moves.
Remark 1 Assume that in Round 1 the oﬀer from player αq is accepted for any
q<q 0, but the oﬀer of αq0 is rejected. Then a new subgame begins, which coin-
cides with the LBM associated to
¡
N \{ αq0},v −αq0,C−αq0
¢
. Moreover, when all
the oﬀers are accepted in Round 1, another subgame begins, which is equivalent




Before the characterization of the SPNE outcomes of the levels bidding mech-
anism we need the following result.
Proposition 2 Given a triple (N,v,C) ∈ LTU(N) such that (N,v) is zero-













levels coalition structure. Assume




structure on M which equals C/C1 except for the name of the players, i.e.
{q1,q 2,...,qk} ∈ Ql :⇔ {[Cq1],[Cq2],...,[Cqk]} ∈ [Cl]1 ≤ l ≤ h.
































if q ∈ R
if q/ ∈ R
¾
w = w1 + w2.
Notice that the game u on M equals the quotient game v/C1 on C1.T h u s ,
































Finally, the levels structure value of q for the game w2 is:
Ψq(M,w2,Q)=v({j}).
By applying the zero-monotonicity of v,w eg e tΨq(M,u,Q) ≥ Ψq(M,w,Q).
By additivity of the levels structure value
X
i∈Cq






8In order to cope with technical problems of ties, we need an additional
assumption on the SPNE’s. These problems appear when players are indiﬀerent
between two or more strategies yielding the same payoﬀ. In the last section we
study an example of a game such that the associated LBMs have SPNE outcomes
whose payoﬀ is diﬀerent from the levels structure value.
Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2002) make a modiﬁcation to their mechanism,
so that the player who rejects an oﬀer, and the proposer whose oﬀer is rejected,
must pay a small penalty ε > 0.
In this article, we will not move in that direction. Moldovanu and Winter
(1994) assume that players prefer agreements which involves large coalitions
better than smaller ones (provided his ﬁnal payoﬀ i st h es a m ei nb o t ha g r e e -
ments). Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) assume that players “break ties in favor of
quick termination of the game”1. In this paper we make both assumptions.
As a consequence of our assumptions, we can deﬁne a tie-breaking rule sat-
isfying:
• If a player is indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting an oﬀer from a
proposer, he always accepts the oﬀer.
• If a proposer α ∈ Cq is indiﬀerent between oﬀering bα or e bα being bα due
to be rejected by some player i ∈ Cq\{α},a n de bα being accepted by every
player in Cq\{α},h ea l w a y so ﬀers e bα.
In the rest of the section, by SPNE we mean SPNE satisfying this tie-
breaking rule.
A similar approach by means of tie-breaking rule for SPNE’s can be found in
Navarro and Perea (2001). In their model, a player must choose prices, propose
oﬀers and accept or reject oﬀers2. If a player is indiﬀerent between accepting or
rejecting an oﬀer, he is supposed to accept. If, under certain circumstances, a
player is indiﬀerent between proposing ∆ or e ∆ with ∆ < e ∆, he is supposed to
propose e ∆. If a player is indiﬀerent between choosing price p or e p with p<e p,
he is supposed to choose price p.
Theorem 3 The LBM implements the levels structure value in SPNE for su-
peradditive games.
Proof. The structure of this proof is similar to that of the main result by
Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2002). However, the computations are diﬀerent.
We proceed by double induction on h and n.F o r h =1 , the mechanism
coincide with those by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). Thus, we assume
the players play according to a strategy proﬁle described in Pérez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001) when they construct, for any zero-monotonic game, an SPNE
that yields the Shapley value of this game as a payoﬀ outcome. It is easy to check
1However, tie-breaking rules are not needed in Hart and Mas-Colell’s model.
2These oﬀers are diﬀerences in payoﬀs to be received at the end of the mechanism.
9that this SPNE satisﬁes the tie-breaking rule. So, the mechanism implements
the levels structure value.
Assume the result is true for levels structures of degree at most h − 1.
We now prove the result when the degree is h. If there is only a player it
is trivial. Assume that if there are at most n − 1 players the LBM implements
the levels structure value in SPNE and, moreover, all the oﬀers of Round 1 are
accepted in equilibrium. We now prove that the same holds when there are n
players.
We ﬁrst prove that the levels structure value is indeed an equilibrium out-
come. We explicitly construct an SPNE which yields the levels structure value
as an SPNE outcome.
We consider the following strategies.
Round 1. First, we deﬁne the strategies in the LBM associated to any
Cq ∈ C1.
Stage 1. For any i ∈ Cq, bi
j = Ψj (N,v,C) − Ψj (N \{ i},v −i,C−i) for any
j ∈ Cq \{ i}.




N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
to
every j ∈ Cq \{ αq}.





N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
for every j ∈ Cq \{ αq}.
If some oﬀer is rejected, for instance, the oﬀer of αq0,w eg ot ot h es u b g a m e
where all players other than αq0 play this mechanism in
¡
N \{ αq0},v −αq0,C−αq0
¢
.
We assume that players in N \{ αq0} play according to the strategies proﬁles
of some SPNE with payoﬀ associated Ψ
¡
N \{ αl0},v −αl0,C−αl0
¢
(by induction
hypothesis on n we can ﬁnd such SPNE).
Rounds 2 through h. We assume that the representatives play according to




by induction hypothesis on h,w ec a nﬁnd such SPNE.
It is straightforward to prove that these strategies satisfy the tie-breaking
rule.
First, we prove that according to these strategies any player i ∈ N receives
as payoﬀ the levels structure value Ψi(N,C,v). We must note that for any
Cq ∈ C1 the oﬀer from αq is accepted. Then player αq goes to Round 2 as the
representative of Cq.











N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
= Ψi(N,v,C).
We now compute the payoﬀ of any representative rq.A sv is superadditive
we have that v/C1 is also superadditive. By induction hypothesis on h,w ek n o w
10that the payoﬀ obtained by rq in Rounds 2 through h (p2
rq) coincides with the
levels structure value of
¡
C1,v/C1,C/C1¢











































We now prove that these strategies are an SPNE. By induction hypothesis
on h, we conclude that in the subgames obtained after Round 2 these strategies
induce an SPNE.
By induction hypothesis on n, in all the subgames obtained after the rejection
of the oﬀer of some proposer αq, these strategies induce an SPNE.
We only have to prove that these strategies induce an SPNE in the bidding
mechanism associated to any coalition Cq (Round 1).
Stage 3. Assume that player i rejects the oﬀer of αq. Then the LBM mech-
anism of
¡
N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
is played and, by induction hypothesis on n,
after the rejection player i c a no b t a i na tm o s tΨi
¡
N \{ αq},v −αq,C −αq
¢
. Hence,





N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
= Ψi(N,v,C).
This means that player i does not improve his payoﬀ.
Stage 2. If player αq oﬀers to some player i ∈ Cq less than Ψi
¡
N \{ αq},v −αq,C −αq
¢
,







N \{ αq},v −αl,C−αq
¢¤
.
By Proposition 2, this payoﬀ is not larger than Ψαq(N,v,C), which means that
player αq does not improve his payoﬀ.
If player αq oﬀers to any player i ∈ Cq\{αq} at least Ψi
¡
N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
,
the oﬀer is accepted. It is easy to prove that player αq obtains at most Ψαq(N,v,C).


















[Ψi(N,v,C) − Ψi (N \{ j},v −j,C−j)].
As the levels structure value satisﬁes balanced contributions, we have that for
any j ∈ Cq \{ i},
Ψi (N,v,C) − Ψi (N \{ j},v −j,C−j)=Ψj (N,v,C) − Ψj (N \{ i},v −i,C−i)
and hence Bi =0 .
Assume that player i ∈ Cq makes a diﬀerent bid b∗.I fB∗i < 0, the proposer
will be another player of Cq.T h e np l a y e ri can not increase his payoﬀ.





other players of Cq \{i}. It is straightforward to prove that player i can obtain,










which is smaller than Ψi(N,v,C).
If B∗i =0and player i is not the proposer, using similar arguments to those
used when B∗i < 0, we can conclude that player i does not increase his payoﬀ.
If B∗i =0and player i is the proposer, using similar arguments to those used
when B∗i > 0 we can conclude that player i does not increase his payoﬀ.
We now prove that the payoﬀ in all SPNE outcomes coincides with the levels
structure value. We do it in several steps.
Step A. At every SPNE outcome, and for every Cq ∈ C1, the oﬀer from the




N \{ αq},v −αq,C−αq
¢
and
every i ∈ Cq \{ αq} a c c e p t st h i so ﬀer.
Assume that in each coalition Cq ∈ {C1,...,Cm−1},t h eo ﬀer from a proposer
αq ∈ Cq is accepted, and consider the subgame starting with the last coalition
Cm. Let αm ∈ Cm be the proposer in Cm. Let yαm be an oﬀer from αm. Let
the order of reply of the players in Cm \{ αm} be i1,...,ik.
Claim 1: At every SPNE, the strategies of the players in Cm \{ αm} must
satisfy the following statements:
(i) If y
αm
i ≥ Ψi (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm) for every i ∈ Cm\{αm},t h e ne v e r y
i ∈ Cm \{ αm} accepts yαm.
12(ii) If y
αm
j < Ψj (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm) for some j ∈ Cm \{ αm}, then
some player in Cm \{ αm} rejects yαm.
(i) Consider the strategy of the last player ik. Assuming that his deci-





whereas if he rejects yαm, then by the induction hypothesis he obtains b
αm
ik +
Ψik (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm). Hence, at any SPNE,
• if y
αm




ik = Ψik (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm), then ik accepts the oﬀer because
of the tie-breaking rule.
Repeating the same argument backwards, we can show that players ik−1,...,i1
accept the oﬀer.
(ii) Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists j ∈ Cm \{ αm} with y
αm
j <
Ψj (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm), but all the players in Cm \{ αm} accept the oﬀer




j . However, if player j deviates and rejects
the oﬀer, then he obtains b
αm





j . Hence, the strategies of the players in Cm \{αm} cannot constitute
an SPNE.
Claim 2: At every SPNE outcome, every i ∈ Cm \{ αm} accepts the oﬀer
from the proposer αm.
Suppose, to the contrary, that at some SPNE outcome, there exists i ∈
Cm \{ αm} who rejects the oﬀer yαm. Then, the proposer obtains






Suppose that the proposer αm proposes z
αm
i = Ψi (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm)
to every i ∈ Cm \{ αm}. By Claim 1 (i), every i ∈ Cm \{ αm} accepts zαm.
Hence, player αm is the representative of coalition Cm in Round 2. Now, in
Rounds 2 through h, there are m players {α1,...,αm}, where, for any coalition
Cq ∈ C1, αq is the representative of coalition Cq. As the representatives are
p l a y i n ga nS P N Eo ft h eL B Ma s s o c i a t e dt o
¡
C1,v/C1,C/C1¢
, by induction hy-
pothesis on h we know that the payoﬀ obtained by player αm in Rounds 2
through h is Ψ[Cm]
¡
C1,v/C1,C/C1¢























Ψi (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm) ≥ v({αm}).
13Thus, e ≤ e e.
• If e<e e,t oo ﬀer yαm cannot be an SPNE strategy of the proposer αm,
which is a contradiction.
• If e = e e,t h e nαm is indiﬀerent between oﬀering yαm or zαm. By Claim 1
(i), oﬀer zαm is accepted by every i ∈ Cm\{αm}. By the tie-breaking rule αm
must propose zαm better than yαm, which is a contradiction.
Claim 3: At every SPNE, and for every i ∈ Cm \{ αm},w eh a v ey
αm
i =
Ψi (N \{ αm},C −αm,v −αm).
Let yαm be the oﬀer from αm at an SPNE. By Claim 2, yαm must be accepted
by every i ∈ Cm \{ αm}. Then, it follows from Claim 1 (ii) that for every
i ∈ Cm \{ αm},y
αm
i ≥ Ψi (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm). Suppose that for some j ∈
Cm\{αm},y
αm
j > Ψj (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm). For each i ∈ Cm\{αm}, deﬁne
w
αm
i = Ψi (N \{ αm},v −αm,C−αm). Suppose that the proposer αm deviates and















the proposer αm obtains a greater payoﬀ by oﬀering wαm than by oﬀering yαm.
Hence, to oﬀer yαm cannot be an SPNE strategy, which is a contradiction.
Repeating the same arguments for coalitions Cm−1,...,C1, we prove Step A.
Step B.A s s u m et h a tw ea r ei nS t a g e1o fR o u n d1o f t h eL B Ma s s o c i a t e d
to Cq ∈ C1.T h e ni na n yS P N E ,Bi =0for any i ∈ Cq.
It is easy to prove that
P
i∈Cq
Bi =0 . We take X =
½









If X 6= Cq, we get a contradiction by proving that player i ∈ X has a
deviation which improves his ﬁnal payoﬀ. We take j ∈ Cq\X such that Bj ≥ Bk
for any k ∈ Cq\X. Assume that player i makes a new bid b0i, where b0i
k = bi
k+δ
if k ∈ X \{ i}, b0i
j = bi
j − |X|δ,a n db0i
k = bi
k if k ∈ Cq \ (X ∪ {j}).
For any k ∈ Cq, we compute B0k assuming that b0k = bk for any k ∈ Cq\{i}.
Then B0k = Bk−δ if k ∈ X, B0j = Bj+|X|δ,a n dB0k = Bk if k ∈ Cl\(X ∪ {j}).
Since Bj <B i, we can ﬁnd δ > 0 satisfying Bj + |X|δ <B i − δ.M o r e o v e r ,
X0 =
½




= X. This means that any player of X is
the proposer with the same probability under bi and b0i.W h e np l a y e ri is not
the proposer, which happens with probability
|X|−1
|X| , he obtains, by Step A,t h e
same making a bid bi or b0i. But if player i is the proposer, which happens with
probability 1
|X|,h eo b t a i n s ,b yS t e pA, δ units more with b0i than with bi.
14Step C. Assume that we are in Stage 1 of Round 1 of the LBM associated
to Cl ∈ C. Then, at every SPNE, the payoﬀ of any player i ∈ Cq is the same
regardless of who is chosen as the proposer.
By Step B, we know that Bi =0for any i ∈ Cl.
Assume that some player i strictly prefers to be (not to be) the proposer.
Then player i can improve his payoﬀ by slightly increasing (decreasing) one of
his bids bi
j. But this is impossible in an SPNE.
Step D. In any SPNE outcome of LBM any player i ∈ N obtains as ﬁnal
payoﬀ his levels structure value.
Assume that players are playing according to some SPNE. Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C1,
we denote by pi the ﬁnal payoﬀ obtained by player i in this SPNE.
By Step B, we know that any player of Cq is the proposer with probability
1
|Cq|.











If j ∈ Cq \{i} is the proposer then the ﬁnal payoﬀ of player i i s ,b yS t e pA,
b
j
i + Ψi (N \{ j},v −j,C−j).


















i + Ψi (N \{ j},v −j,C−j)
i
.
















Since the levels structure value satisﬁes the property of balanced contribu-
















Then pi = Ψi (N,v,C).
154C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have developed a bidding mechanism which implements the
levels structure value of every superadditive game with a levels structure of
cooperation. The mechanism is a generalization of the bidding model presented
by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
In equilibrium, we have imposed that players prefer large coalitions to small
ones. Next example shows that this condition is needed. Notice that players
from coalition {1,2} are indiﬀerent between leaving the game or not (they obtain
0 anyway). However, players in {3,4} are sensitive to player 1 or player 2 leaving
the game.
Consider (N,v,C) with h =2 ,w h e r eN = {1,2,3,4}, C = {C0,C1,C2},
C1 = {{1,2},{3,4}}.M o r e o v e r , v is the characteristic function associated to
the weighted majority game where the quota is 3 and the weights are 1, 1, 1,
and 2 respectively. This means that v(S)=1if and only if S contains some of
the following subsets: {1,2,3}, {1,4}, {2,4},o r{3,4}.







































Round 1. First, we describe the strategies of players 1 and 2. The bids
are b1
2 = b2
1 =0 . Then, the proposer α is randomly chosen between 1 and 2.
Moreover, yα
j =0and player j accepts the oﬀer of α if and only if α oﬀers him
something strictly positive.
We now describe the strategies of players 3 and 4. In the subgame obtained
after the oﬀer of α is accepted, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide with
the strategies whose payoﬀ outcome is the levels structure value. We know that
these strategies exist by Theorem 3. In the subgame obtained after the oﬀer of
α is rejected, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide with the strategies whose
payoﬀ outcome is the levels structure value of (N \{ α},v −α,C−α).
Round 2. We assume the representatives play according to the strategies
described in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), which implement the levels
structure value.
It is not diﬃcult to check that these strategies are an SPNE. However, they
do not satisfy the tie-breaking rule.
According to these strategies, the oﬀer of player α is rejected, which means
that player α obtains a ﬁnal payoﬀ of v({α})=0 .T h e n p l a y e r s o f N \{ α}
obtain as ﬁnal payoﬀ Ψ(N \{ α},v −α,C−α). This means that the ﬁnal payoﬀ
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